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STANDING  FOR  NOTHING
Robert A. Mikos*
A growing number of courts and commentators have suggested that states have Article III
standing to protect state law.  Proponents of such “protective” standing argue that states must be
given access to federal court whenever their laws are threatened.  Absent such access, they claim,
many state laws might prove toothless, thereby undermining the value of the states in our federal
system.  Furthermore, proponents insist that this form of special solicitude is very limited—that it
opens the doors to the federal courthouses a crack but does not swing them wide open.  This
Essay, however, contests both of these claims, and thus, the normative case for protective state
standing.  It demonstrates that states do not actually need protective state standing to enforce or
defend their laws.  Rather, if states need it at all, it is for an altogether different and more
controversial purpose: to attack federal law.  Indeed, the Essay shows that notwithstanding the
assurances of its proponents, protective standing could enable the states to challenge virtually
any federal policy they find disagreeable in federal court, making them “roving constitutional
watchdogs” over the federal government.
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INTRODUCTION
Invoking a line of cases showing special solicitude toward the states in
meeting Article III’s jurisdictional requirements, some courts and commenta-
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tors have suggested that states have a special interest in the “power to create
and enforce a legal code,”1 threats to which give states standing “to enforce
or to protect the continued enforceability of their laws” in federal court.2
Put another way, the states suffer a concrete and particularized injury for
purposes of Article III’s standing requirements when the federal government
undermines state law, say, by preempting a state statute.  Importantly, this
injury to the state’s sovereign interests is distinct from other types of injury a
state may allege to establish standing, including harm to the state’s proprie-
tary interests (roughly speaking, its finances) or to its quasi-sovereign inter-
ests (the “well-being of its populace”).3  Thus, standing to protect state law,
which this Essay dubs “protective standing,” expands state access to the fed-
eral courts, especially in litigation with the federal government.4
But should states be given special solicitude just to protect their laws in
federal court?  The normative case for protective standing appears to rest on
two central claims.5  The first claim is that the states need protective standing
to fulfil their essential role in our federal system.  The argument goes like
this: if the states could not invoke federal jurisdiction whenever their laws are
threatened, they could not pursue distinct policies, serve as the laboratories
of democracy, provide a bulwark against federal tyranny, and so on.  Profes-
sor Tara Leigh Grove, one of the leading proponents of protective standing,
insists that “state governments must have the authority to enforce and to pro-
tect the continued enforceability of their laws in court; absent such a power,
States could not enforce many laws at all.”6
While the first claim seeks to establish protective standing’s value, the
second claim seeks to defray concerns about its costs.  The fear is that showing
states special solicitude could give them too much access to the federal
courts, elevating them into “roving constitutional watchdog[s],” able to liti-
1 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
2 Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851,
859 (2016). See generally Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II et al., State Sovereign Standing: Often Over-
looked, but Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89 (2012); Bradford C. Mank, State Standing in
United States v. Texas: Opening the Floodgates to States Challenging the Federal Government, or
Proper Federalism?, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 211; Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State
Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2017).
3 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602 (providing a useful description of the grounds upon which a
state might assert standing).  For a different description of the interests giving rise to state
standing, see generally Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L.
REV. 387 (1995).
4 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 209, 219 (2014) (“Deviating from the private [standing] analogy, . . . states have
been able to use sovereignty interests as the basis for APA or related actions attacking
agency determinations that purport to preempt state law.”).
5 For articles defending protective state standing in some form, see supra note 2.
Grove has provided the most robust and forceful defense of protective state standing to
date, and this Essay focuses predominantly on her theory of protective standing.  Although
I remain unconvinced by that theory, I highly recommend her article, Grove, supra note 2,
to anyone interested in the law governing state standing.
6 See Grove, supra note 2, at 855–56 (second emphasis added).
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gate any dispute with the federal government, “no matter how generalized or
quintessentially political.”7  Even defenders of protective standing acknowl-
edge that there must be some limits imposed on state access to federal court.8
But proponents of protective standing insist that this particular form of spe-
cial solicitude is limited—that it opens the doors of the federal courthouses a
crack but does not take them off of their hinges entirely.  For example, Grove
insists that protective standing only gives states the opportunity “to challenge
federal statutes and regulations that preempt, or otherwise undermine the
continued enforceability of, state law,” but does not likewise enable them to
challenge “the manner in which the federal executive enforces federal law.”9
This Essay contests both of these claims, and thus, the normative case for
protective state standing.10  First, the Essay argues that proponents of protec-
tive standing have overstated the need for and value of standing to protect
state law.  It demonstrates that states can adequately enforce and defend
their laws without resort to protective standing, either in state court, where fed-
eral standing rules do not apply, or in federal court, where other doctrines
ensure that states can defend their laws.  Canvassing all of the procedural
circumstances in which state law might be threatened leads to the same con-
clusion: protective state standing does not appreciably enhance the states’
ability to protect state law.  It is, in other words, standing for nothing.
Second, while states may not need protective standing for its intended
purpose, they could use it for another purpose: to attack federal law.  Often,
the only way for a state to “defend” its law is by challenging the federal policy
that undermines it.  Once we recognize this, it becomes clear that a state’s
professed desire to “protect” state law could serve as a pretext, i.e., as a way to
establish protective standing and thereby air sundry political disagreements
with the federal government in federal court.  Indeed, such use (or abuse) of
protective standing may be more common and more difficult to control than
protective standing’s defenders have recognized.
In short, protective state standing accomplishes little (or none) of what
advocates use to justify it, and it invites the abuse even advocates hope to
avoid.
The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I explains in greater detail why states
do not necessarily need special standing rules to protect state law.  It does so
by surveying the universe of procedural circumstances in which state law
might be threatened and demonstrating that states could adequately enforce
7 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011).  For criti-
cisms of special solicitude regarding state standing, see, for example, Alexander M. Bickel,
The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 3, at 396
(“[S]tate standing has a serious potential to undermine rather than complement individ-
ual standing in constitutional cases.”).
8 See, e.g., Grove, supra note 2, at 895–99; Nash, supra note 2, at 230–36.
9 Grove, supra note 2, at 855 (emphasis omitted).
10 The Essay does not delve into the descriptive claim that protective standing exists as a
matter of Supreme Court precedent.  The main point here is to question the desirability of
recognizing such standing, whether or not it is already part of standing doctrine.
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and defend their laws in those circumstances without protective standing.11
Part II then explains why the special solicitude shown by protective standing
rules could give states broad latitude to attack federal law in federal court.  It
also suggests that defenders of protective standing have not yet devised any
effective way to stop states from manufacturing protective standing and thus
making every complaint they might have with the federal government a cog-
nizable case to be heard and adjudicated by a federal court.
I. STANDING FOR NOTHING
This Part demonstrates that the case for protective state standing has
been exaggerated.  It does so by highlighting the ways states can enforce and
defend their laws in different procedural circumstances without resort to protec-
tive standing.  Section I.A examines circumstances in which the state is a party
to litigation; Section I.B then examines circumstances in which the state is a
bystander to litigation.  The examination demonstrates that states are rarely
(if ever) powerless to enforce or defend their laws, even if they are denied
protective standing.
A. When the State Is a Party
This Section assesses a state’s ability to enforce and defend its laws when
the state is a named party in litigation.  It discusses the state’s options as
plaintiff (or prosecutor), defendant, and appellant.
1. State as Plaintiff
To begin, consider the scenario where the state is the plaintiff (or prose-
cutor) in litigation—that is, situations in which the state initiates litigation to
enforce its laws against another party.
Although the states plainly need the ability to enforce their laws in a
court, that does not have to be a federal court.  Indeed, in this context, states
have little need for protective state standing.  Against the vast majority of
defendants, states can enforce their laws in their own courts (i.e., state
courts) regardless of whether they would have standing (protective or other-
wise) in federal court.12  After all, state courts are not inherently bound by the
same standing rules that limit access to the federal courts.13  Put another way,
11 As others have previously recognized, attention to procedural circumstances is criti-
cal for accurately assessing the need for any special standing rules. See, e.g., Woolhander &
Collins, supra note 3, at 397 (“Issues of state standing are highly dependent on the litiga-
tional role of the government in particular contexts.”).
12 See, e.g., id. at 392 (“When it prosecutes criminal and civil actions under its own laws
in its own courts, no issue ordinarily arises as to its standing.”).
13 For discussions of standing rules in state courts and how they differ from standing
rules in federal courts, see, for example, Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001); Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law
by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003 (2001).
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in the paradigmatic case involving the enforcement of state law, states have
little need to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and, thus, little
need for protective (or any other form of) standing.  As the Supreme Court
has recognized, states “have a variety of means by which they can enforce
their own laws in their own courts, and they do not suffer if the pre-emption
questions such enforcement may raise are tested there.”14
In fact, it appears the only time when a state might need to enforce its
own laws in federal court—and thus, need to establish standing there—is
when a defendant successfully removes the state’s enforcement action to fed-
eral court.  Congress has provided for the removal of a variety of state court
cases when certain jurisdictional requirements are met, such as when the suit
involves a federal question, diversity of parties, or is an action against a fed-
eral official or agency.15
However, the prospect of removal does not actually demonstrate a need
for protective state standing.  Perhaps most importantly, this is because most
defendants cannot remove cases involving state-law causes of action.  For
example, defendants may not remove a case merely by invoking “a federal
defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is antici-
pated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties admit that the
defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.”16  Instead, to remove a
case on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, defendants must demon-
strate that a “substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary ele-
ment of one of the well-pleaded state claims, or that one or the other claim is
‘really’ one of federal law.”17  This well-pleaded complaint rule would be dif-
ficult to satisfy precisely when protective standing is thought to be most
needed—namely, when a defendant challenges a state-law cause of action as
preempted.
In any event, even if a defendant is able to satisfy the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule (or is able to find some other basis for removal),18 the state still
does not need to establish standing to continue the case in federal court.
That burden falls upon the defendant, who is the party invoking federal court
jurisdiction.  As the Seventh Circuit observed in Collier v. SP Plus Corp., the
defendant must “establish that all elements of jurisdiction—including [the
14 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 21 (1983).
15 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–45 (2012).
16 Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. at 14.
17 Id. at 13.  As discussed infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text, a small class of
defendants (federal defendants) need not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule.
18 For example, under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), a defendant who is not a resident of the
state could seek to remove the case against it on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
Although the well-pleaded complaint rule would not apply—that rule applies only when
removal is based on federal question jurisdiction—other doctrines might foreclose
removal. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005) (“Defendants may
remove an action on the basis of diversity of citizenship if there is complete diversity between
all named plaintiffs and all named defendants, and no defendant is a citizen of the forum
State.” (emphasis added)).
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plaintiff’s] Article III standing—existed at the time of removal.”19  Impor-
tantly, if the defendant fails to meet this burden—i.e., if the defendant fails
to establish that the state would have standing to bring the action in federal
court—the “district court must remand it to the state court from which it was
removed,”20 not dismiss the case.  These limits on removal ensure that a state
normally will be able to enforce its laws in state court without ever needing to
establish standing in federal court.
Of course, there is a small subset of defendants to whom these limits do
not apply: to simplify somewhat, federal officials and federal agencies.21
These federal defendants need not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule.22
Instead, to remove a case from state court, federal defendants need only
allege “a colorable federal defense.”23  And against federal defendants who
can satisfy this standard,24 the state would have no parens patriae standing.25
But even with protective standing, the state still could not continue its
case against these defendants.  Defendants who can successfully remove a
state case very likely also have immunity to the state action, such as sovereign
immunity or Supremacy Clause immunity.  The tests for removal and immu-
nity are quite similar.26  Hence, demonstrating “a colorable federal defense”
19 Collier v. SP Plus Corp., 889 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (emphasis
added).
20 Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added); see also Int’l Primate
Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 78 n.4 (1991) (“If removal was
improper, the case must be remanded to state court, where the requirements of Article III
plainly will not apply.”).
21 Congress has provided for the removal of such cases.  28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (“A
civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against
or directed to [the United States or any agency thereof or any officer of the United States]
. . . may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place wherein it is pending . . . .”); see also Michael G. Collins &
Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State Courts, 97 VA. L. REV. 243, 278
(2011) (“Building on a series of nineteenth-century statutes—the first as early as 1815—
federal officer removal statutes today allow for removal to federal court of prosecutions
commenced against federal officers in state courts for ‘any act under color of’ their office.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006))).
Congress has also provided more generous rules of removal in a limited class of civil
rights cases involving defendants who are private citizens.  28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2012).  How-
ever, because the state could proceed against such private citizens in federal court on the
basis of its parens patriae standing, removal still does not create the need for protective state
standing.
22 See Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 430–31 (1999).
23 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989).
24 Not all federal defendants are able to do so.  In Mesa v. California, for example, the
Supreme Court denied removal of a state manslaughter prosecution against a federal pos-
tal employee because the defendant failed to allege any federal defense against the
charges. Id. at 139.
25 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923) (holding that states have no
parens patriae standing vis-à-vis the federal government).
26 Cf. Collins & Nash, supra note 21, at 281 (explaining that “as a practical matter,
removal under the federal officer statutes often spells dismissal on the merits” because “the
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to a state cause of action also likely establishes the federal defendant’s immu-
nity to the state’s claims.  Put another way, protective standing would not
enhance the state’s ability to enforce its laws against federal defendants
because, with or without standing, the state’s case will be dismissed.27
Although removal coupled with immunity does prevent a state from try-
ing and punishing federal defendants who break state law, it does not
thereby deprive the state of the opportunity to defend its law in federal court.
The state can defend its laws by contesting both removal and immunity in
federal court.  In challenging a defendant’s assertion of Supremacy Clause
immunity, for example, the state is, in effect, challenging preemption of the
state charges against the defendant.28  Contrary to what proponents of pro-
tective standing suggest,29 the state does not need protective standing to
mount that challenge.  The deprivation of the state’s interest in pursuing its
claims in a particular court (state court) constitutes a cognizable injury that
gives the state standing to contest removal and immunity before the federal
district court.30  The fact that the state’s challenge to immunity is almost
guaranteed to fail is immaterial for our purposes.  Protective standing does
not limit Congress’s power to preempt state law.  Simply put, under the
Supremacy Clause, Congress is entitled to preempt state law claims against
federal officials at any stage of the proceedings,31 whether or not the state
would have standing to sue those officials in federal court.
federal defense that would allow for removal might also provide the basis for dismissal of
the prosecution, based on the Supremacy Clause”).  The commonality in the standards for
removal and immunity may explain the apparent absence of any state criminal prosecu-
tions against federal officers in federal court.
27 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Supremacy
Clause immunity, when properly established, provides an absolute immunity to
prosecution.”).
28 See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers,
State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2214 (2003) (“Whether a
federally based conception of officer immunity may shield a federal officer from state crim-
inal prosecution . . . is comparable to questions of preemption.”).
29 See Grove, supra note 2, at 860 n.36 (noting that “the Supreme Court has not
doubted state standing to appeal cases removed under [§ 1442],” but suggesting that the
“State’s only interest was the enforcement of state criminal law”).
30 E.g., Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77
(1991) (“Petitioners’ injury is clear, for they have lost the right to sue in Louisiana court—
the forum of their choice.”); see also id. at 78 (“The ‘adverseness’ necessary to resolving the
removal question is supplied not by petitioners’ [substantive] claims . . . but rather by peti-
tioners’ desire to prosecute their claims in state court.”).
31 Indeed, it is easy to see why Congress would want to spare federal defendants from
liability or even burdensome trials on those claims. See, e.g., Waxman & Morrison, supra
note 28, at 2231 (“[S]ubjecting federal officers to state criminal sanctions for carrying out
their federally appointed duties could make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the
federal government to function.  Even the most dedicated federal servant would be reluc-
tant to do his job conscientiously if he knew it could mean prison time in the state
penitentiary.”).
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In sum, the possibility that defendants might seek to remove state
enforcement actions to federal court does not demonstrate a need for pro-
tective state standing.  Notwithstanding removal, a state can enforce or
defend the enforceability of its laws without such standing.
States do, of course, sometimes choose to file suit in federal court, but
that does not demonstrate that they need to do so, or, consequently, that they
need protective state standing.  Texas’s challenge to the Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program
illustrates the point.32
Texas filed its lawsuit in federal court, likely the only permissible forum
because it had named the United States and sundry federal officials as
defendants.  And because it was the party invoking the federal court’s juris-
diction, Texas had to establish its own standing.33  To meet its burden, Texas
claimed two distinct injuries.  First, it claimed that because DAPA had
changed the legal status of some undocumented immigrants, the State would
have to issue driver’s licenses to DAPA beneficiaries.34  But because the State
charged license fees that did not cover the costs of issuing licenses (i.e., it
subsidized driver’s licenses), the State would suffer a financial loss as a
result;35 in other words, Texas claimed an injury to its proprietary interests.
Of course, the State could have avoided this first injury simply by raising
its licensing fees.  But the State claimed that having to change its law would
constitute a second cognizable injury: an injury to its sovereign interests, i.e.,
the interests that trigger protective standing.36
Although Texas had to convince the court that it had standing to bring
the suit, it is important to recognize that Texas did not need to initiate the suit
in the first instance, at least if it was only interested in protecting state law or
avoiding financial loss.  After all, Texas could have just continued to deny
driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants, including DAPA benefi-
ciaries.  To be sure, those beneficiaries (or the federal government) might
have sued the state to change the state’s policy.  But in this scenario, as the
defendant in the litigation, Texas would not have needed to establish standing
to defend its laws or challenge DAPA (as discussed in the next subsection).
That responsibility, of course, falls upon the party invoking federal jurisdic-
tion (here, DAPA beneficiaries or the federal government).
Indeed, the State of Arizona was able to defend its own policy of denying
driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants without ever establishing
standing.  Like Texas, Arizona’s policy was threatened by a federal immigra-
tion program, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).  Unlike
Texas, however, Arizona did not sue the federal government to challenge
that program (and thus, ostensibly, defend its own law).  Rather, the State
32 Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
33 Id. at 747.
34 Id. at 748.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 749.
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was sued by a group of DACA beneficiaries.37  In contrast to Texas v. United
States, where the Fifth Circuit devoted considerable attention to the state-
standing issue (discussed below in Section II.B), standing was a nonissue in
Arizona’s case.38  No one questioned Arizona’s ability, as a defendant, to
defend state law in federal court.  In fact, the State put on a defense; it just
lost.39
To be sure, a state may sometimes prefer to litigate in federal court
rather than state court.  Counterintuitively, a state might believe that a fed-
eral court (or a particular federal judge) would be more sympathetic to the
state’s claims in litigation.  Or the state might want relief—such as a nation-
wide injunction—that only a federal court can provide.40  But such consider-
ations do not establish the state’s need for a federal forum, and hence, a
need for standing.  For example, Texas did not need a national injunction to
protect its own driver’s license laws.  Indeed, to the extent that states seek
access to federal court for such reasons, it becomes apparent that states
might use protective state standing to attack federal law rather than to
defend their own—a point discussed in greater detail in Part II below.
2. State as Defendant
Now consider cases where the state finds itself on the other side of litiga-
tion, namely, as a defendant rather than a plaintiff in a lawsuit filed in federal
court.  Assuming the plaintiff has standing and challenges state law (say, as
preempted or unconstitutional), will the state be able to defend its law from
the attack?
The answer is clearly yes, whether or not the state would have standing
to bring the action in federal court itself.  When a state (or any other party) is
dragged into federal court as a defendant, it generally does not need to worry
about establishing standing to defend itself.  It is the plaintiff, or, more pre-
cisely, “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction [that] bears the burden of
establishing the[ ] elements [of standing].”41  Or, to frame the argument
slightly differently, a defendant in federal court obviously has standing
37 Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2014).
38 Grove suggests that the silence on the standing issue demonstrates that all parties
(and courts) agreed the state had protective standing. See Grove, supra note 2, at 894
n.213.  But as discussed in subsection I.A.2 below, the more likely reason is that defendants
do not need to establish standing (or can do so almost automatically, without resort to
special solicitude) when they are sued in federal court.
39 Ariz. Dream Act Coal., 757 F.3d at 1063–69 (imposing a preliminary injunction on
Arizona’s policy on the grounds that it was preempted by federal immigration law or alter-
natively that it violated equal protection).
40 For a helpful discussion of state efforts to obtain nationwide injunctions against the
federal government, see Jonathan Remy Nash, State Standing for Nationwide Injunctions
Against the Federal Government, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1985 (2019).
41 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498–99 (1975) (“As an aspect of justiciability, the standing question is whether the
plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant
his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial
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because the threat of a judgment against it, such as an injunction ordering
the defendant to take (or stop taking) some action or to pay damages, itself
creates the concrete and particularized injury required for purposes of estab-
lishing the defendant’s standing.  Professor Matthew Hall explains:
[D]oubts about a defendant’s standing arise infrequently, because in the vast
majority of cases, the defendant’s standing is apparent.  Any defendant
against whom relief is sought will always have standing to defend, because
the exposure to risk of injury from an adverse judgment is a sufficient per-
sonal stake to satisfy Article III.42
For example, in Arizona v. United States, the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) sued the state in federal court, claiming that a state statute
(S.B. 1070) was preempted by federal immigration laws.43  No one ques-
tioned Arizona’s standing to defend itself against the federal government’s
claims or inquired into the source of such standing, even though the state’s
ability to initiate an antipreemption suit against the federal government
would certainly have raised doubts.44
3. State as Appellant
Regardless of whether it would need standing before a district court as
plaintiff or defendant, a state would need standing to appeal any judgment
issued by that court.  After all, as appellant, the state would be the party
invoking the appellate court’s jurisdiction.
However, a state should have little difficulty establishing standing to
appeal from an adverse judgment, again without resort to protective stand-
ing.  The adverse judgment itself constitutes an injury that establishes stand-
ing for the state qua appellant.45  Any concerns about the state’s ability to
powers on his behalf.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962))).
42 Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1539, 1551–52 (2012); see also id. at 1552 n.63 (“Indeed, the right to defend
when faced with a possible deprivation is a component of due process.  This right to be
heard in one’s own defense is necessarily a sufficient personal stake to create an Article III
case or controversy.” (citation omitted)).  Grove acknowledges the point. See Grove, supra
note 2, at 860 (“A State must often defend its laws in federal court against constitutional
challenge.  The State need not, of course, demonstrate standing when a private party
invokes federal jurisdiction by bringing suit.” (footnote omitted)).
43 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012).
44 In the case, Arizona’s standing was contested, but only with respect to counterclaims
the State had raised against the United States.  The district court dismissed those counter-
claims on other grounds. See United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413, 2011 WL
13137062, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2011).
45 See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3902 (2d
ed. 1996) (“Standing to appeal is not a problem in most cases. . . . The most obvious
difference between standing to appeal and standing to bring suit is that the focus shifts to
injury caused by the judgment rather than injury caused by the underlying facts.”); see also
Hall, supra note 42, at 1572 (“[A] defendant may establish the requisite injury for purposes
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appeal from a judgment absent protective standing thus appear
unfounded.46
B. State as Bystander
Section I.A explained why states do not need protective standing when
they participate in litigation as named parties.  This Section turns to those
cases in which the enforceability of state law may be questioned in federal
court but where the state is not a party; it is merely a bystander.
The paradigmatic case arises when a private plaintiff brings a state-law-
based claim against another party who raises federal law as a defense. Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.47 illustrates.  In Geier, an injured driver sued
Honda in federal court, claiming the manufacturer’s failure to install a
driver’s side airbag in its car constituted a defective design under state com-
mon law.48  Honda then moved for summary judgment, claiming the plain-
tiff’s suit was preempted by federal regulations that sought to give
manufacturers flexibility to choose which passive restraints they installed in
their automobiles.49  The district court, court of appeals, and Supreme Court
all sided with Honda, finding the state tort action was preempted—and thus
unenforceable.50
But when the state is not a party to litigation, it arguably has even less
need for protective standing—even when its laws are challenged (as in Geier).
First, if a lower federal court indeed finds that state law is preempted or
unconstitutional, the state would not be bound by that judgment if it were
not a party to the case.  In practical terms, this means that the state could
continue to enforce its laws in state court, which, likewise, is not bound by
of an appeal simply by showing that he or she is subject to an allegedly incorrect lower
court judgment.”).
46 Grove suggests that states must rely on protective standing to appeal adverse judg-
ments in federal court, using Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), to illustrate:
The case arose out of a determination by a Minnesota state agency that the
Jaycees, a private social club, had violated state antidiscrimination law by exclud-
ing women.  The Jaycees brought suit in federal district court, seeking a declara-
tion that the State’s effort to force them to accept female members violated their
First Amendment right to freedom of association.  When the Jaycees prevailed in
the lower court, no one doubted the State’s standing to appeal to defend its law
against that constitutional challenge.
Grove, supra note 2, at 860 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 612–16, 623, 631).
However, the lack of doubt concerning the State’s standing to appeal the judgment
against it may simply reflect the understanding (noted in the text) that an adverse judg-
ment gives the State standing to appeal.  There is no need to recharacterize the State’s
concrete interest in contesting that judgment—and any orders accompanying it—as some-
thing more abstract, like an interest in protecting the enforceability of its laws.
47 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
48 Id. at 861.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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lower federal court judgments concerning the validity of state laws.51  Thus,
while a state might have a “legitimate interest in the continued enforceability
of its own statutes,”52 it does not necessarily need to defend its laws in federal
court to vindicate that interest.
Second, the state has little need to worry that its laws will go undefended
before the federal courts.  The state can usually rely on one of the named
parties in a suit to defend its laws.  For example, the plaintiff in Geier had a
strong incentive to vigorously defend the state tort law against Honda’s pre-
emption challenge (and did so at each stage of the proceedings) because the
state law provided the plaintiff’s cause of action and only means of relief.
And if the state fears that a party lacks the resources or incentives to defend
state law adequately, the state can always subsidize that party’s legal costs.53
Third, the state can also seek to intervene in litigation and thereby
defend its laws itself before the federal court.54  Importantly, when seeking to
intervene, the state (like other intervenors) usually need not establish its own
standing; it can simply piggyback on the standing of the original parties.55
Thus, a state would not need protective standing in order to intervene in a
case or controversy between other parties.56
There is, however, one very limited scenario in which a state’s ability to
intervene might be doubtful without the luxury of protective standing.
Namely, if a federal court holds that a state law is invalid, but the original
parties decline to appeal the judgment, the state would not be able to inter-
vene without establishing its own standing.  After all, the state could no
longer piggyback on the standing of the original parties.57  It is possible the
state could have some other concrete interest upon which to assert standing,
but since the state was not the target of the adverse judgment, that judgment
does not give it the obvious interest in appeal it would have had as a named
51 See generally Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal
Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2015).  A state is, of
course, bound by the judgments of the United States Supreme Court.
52 Grove, supra note 2, at 861 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986)).
53 For a more detailed discussion on the idea of state indemnification of the legal
expenses of private citizens see Robert A. Mikos, Essay, Indemnification as an Alternative to
Nullification, 76 MONT. L. REV. 57 (2015).
54 The rules of such intervention are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.
55 Hall, supra note 42, at 1560–61 (“Courts have almost always held that the case or
controversy that exists between the original parties satisfies Article III’s jurisdictional
requirement, and that intervenors need not independently establish Article III standing.”).
56 It would, of course, need to satisfy the other requirements for intervention set forth
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, but those requirements should be relatively easy to
meet when state law has been challenged in the case.
57 See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017) (“[A]n
intervenor . . . must have Article III standing in order to pursue relief that is different from
that which is sought by a party with standing.”); Hall, supra note 42, at 1561
(“[I]ntervenors . . . must independently satisfy Article III standing if they seek to litigate
issues beyond those raised by the original parties, or if the case or controversy between the
original parties ceases to exist . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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party (as discussed in subsection I.A.3 above).  The judgment, for example,
does not require the state to do (or not do) anything; indeed, as noted ear-
lier, it probably does not even bind the state.  Thus, in this scenario, it is
plausible that the state’s only interest in pursuing the appeal is to protect the
continued enforceability of a state law in other cases.
Considered in context, however, the threat this scenario poses to the
state’s interest in protecting its laws is minimal.  First, cases in which the origi-
nal parties would abandon their appeal following an adverse lower court
judgment are uncommon (to put it mildly).  For the reasons discussed ear-
lier, at least one of the original parties in litigation usually has the incentive
to defend state law, all the way through appeal.  This may be why intervenors
are “[o]nly rarely . . . required to establish standing in their own right.”58
Grove cites but a single case, Maine v. Taylor,59 in which it appears that a
state needed to establish standing as intervenor to appeal a lower court judg-
ment invalidating one of its laws.  The case involved some peculiar procedu-
ral twists.  It began as a federal criminal prosecution of a Maine baitfish
supplier in federal court.60  The United States charged the defendant with
violating the Lacey Act, a congressional statute that, in simplified terms,
makes it a federal crime to transport wildlife in violation of state law.61  Fed-
eral prosecutors accused the defendant of violating a Maine statute that
banned the importation of live baitfish into the state.62  The defendant
moved to dismiss the prosecution in district court, arguing that the Maine
law forming the basis for the federal prosecution was unconstitutional under
the Dormant Commerce Clause.63  Notified of the attack against its law, the
State of Maine sought to intervene in the case, and its request was granted.64
Before the district court, the United States and Maine successfully
defended the state law.65  At that point, the defendant pled guilty, but he
reserved the right to appeal the court’s dismissal of his constitutional chal-
lenge to the Maine law.  On appeal, both the United States and Maine again
defended the constitutionality of the state law, but the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment.66  It found that
the Maine law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, and it therefore dis-
missed the federal charges against the defendant.67  At this point, the United
States declined to appeal to the Supreme Court.68
What makes the case noteworthy, for our purposes, is that the Supreme
Court allowed the State of Maine to appeal the First Circuit’s judgment.
58 Hall, supra note 42, at 1560.
59 477 U.S. 131 (1986); see Grove, supra note 2, at 860–78 (discussing the case).
60 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 132.
61 Id. at 132–33.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.  Notification and intervention were provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (1982).
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Grove suggests that since the United States had (apparently) abandoned the
case, Maine had to establish its own standing qua intervenor to appeal.69
Furthermore, she suggests that Maine did so by asserting no more than an
interest in protecting the continued enforceability of its baitfish law.70
Indeed, language in the Court’s opinion—which reversed the First Circuit
decision and upheld the state law—suggests as much.  The Court noted that
“a State clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its
own statutes.”71  Thus, Grove suggests that Maine v. Taylor demonstrates not
only the states’ need for protective standing—after all, Maine’s law would
have been deemed unconstitutional by a federal court had the Supreme
Court refused to hear Maine’s appeal—but also the Supreme Court’s
endorsement of the doctrine.
But additional quirks in an already quirky case counsel against drawing
such strong inferences from Maine v. Taylor about the states’ need for, or
even the Court’s endorsement of, protective state standing.  For example,
even though the federal government had declined to appeal the First Cir-
cuit’s judgment, it had not truly abandoned the case.  The Court noted that
the federal government “does not intend to seek dismissal of the indictment
if Maine prevails in this Court.”72  This helps explain why the Court found
that the “controversy . . . clearly remains live notwithstanding the Federal
Government’s decision to abandon its own appeal”;73 after all, reversal of the
First Circuit’s judgment would automatically reinstate the defendant’s guilty
plea.  In addition, there are hints in the opinion that the Court may have
considered Maine to be something more than a mere intervenor in the
case—almost as if the State stood in for the federal government as prosecutor
of the defendant.  Most notably, the Court declared that “if the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed, the State will be bound by the con-
clusive adjudication that its import ban is unconstitutional.”74  As discussed
above, that statement would not be accurate if Maine really had been only an
intervenor: it could have initiated its own state law prosecution against the
defendant in state court, notwithstanding a lower federal court’s judgment
that the state law is unconstitutional.  For all of these reasons, not to mention
the rarity of the scenario it poses, Maine v. Taylor seems a particularly slender
reed on which to base the case for protective state standing.
II. STANDING TO ATTACK FEDERAL LAW
Although states do not need special solicitude to protect state law, such
solicitude would give them greater opportunities to appear in federal court
for a very different purpose: to attack federal law.  This Part explores this over-
69 See Grove, supra note 2, at 861.
70 Id.
71 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137.
72 Id. at n.7.
73 Id. at 137.
74 Id.  This statement appears right before the Court notes the State’s “interest in the
continued enforceability of its [law].” Id.
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looked downside of protective state standing.  It suggests that recognizing
standing based solely on purported threats to state law gives states nearly
unfettered ability to challenge federal policies in federal courts.  What is
more, there is little that federal courts can do to curb such abuse of this
special solicitude.
A. Protecting State Law Means Attacking Federal Law
Proponents of protective state standing commonly insist that it gives
states standing only to protect state law.75  But what those advocates fail to
acknowledge is that “protecting state law” almost of necessity entails “attack-
ing federal law.”  In other words, they are two sides of the same coin.  Giving
states standing to “protect” state law thus necessarily means giving them
standing to “attack” federal law as well.
The connection between protecting state law and attacking federal law is
most obvious in preemption cases.  When state law is challenged as pre-
empted, the state’s interest in preserving its law—ironically, the same interest
behind protective state standing—is utterly irrelevant for the merits decision.76
Namely, when a court is trying to decide whether a state law has been pre-
empted by federal law, the court pays no attention whatsoever to the state’s
interests in preserving that law.77  Instead, the court focuses exclusively on
Congress’s interest in blocking state law.78  Thus, to defeat a preemption
challenge stemming from a federal law, the state must challenge the federal
law—i.e., to deny that Congress (or an agency) had the power to pass it in
the first instance.
If it is to accomplish anything, then, protective state standing must
enable states to mount this attack on federal law, e.g., to challenge the consti-
tutionality of federal actions that purport to preempt state law.79  Indeed,
many of the cases on which proponents of protective state standing base their
75 See, e.g., Grove, supra note 2, at 854–55 (“States are entitled to ‘special solicitude’ in
the standing analysis in only one context: when they seek to enforce or defend state law.”
(emphasis added)).
76 See Robert A. Mikos, Making Preemption Less Palatable: State Poison Pill Legislation, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2017) [hereinafter Mikos, Making Preemption Less Palatable]
(“[W]hen it comes to making preemption decisions, our current system utterly fails to
balance the interests of the states against those of the federal government.  It focuses
almost exclusively on one side of the scale, namely, Congress’s interest in blocking state
law, and ignores the other side, the states’ interest in preserving their regulatory
authority.”).
77 Id.  As the Supreme Court has surmised, “[t]he relative importance to the State of
its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers
of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.”  Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663, 666 (1962).
78 Mikos, Making Preemption Less Palatable, supra note 76, at 12.
79 The state could also challenge an interpretation of federal law, to defuse any poten-
tial conflict between that law and the state’s own law.  But seeking to narrow the applica-
tion of federal law is itself an “attack” of sorts.  Like a constitutional challenge, it narrows
the application of the federal law. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (demur-
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argument for special solicitude involve state attacks on federal laws.  In these
cases, concern for the ongoing enforceability of state law is often no more
than an afterthought (if it is implicated at all).  Consider Missouri v. Hol-
land.80  In the case, the State of Missouri challenged a federal treaty that
regulated the killing of migratory birds that passed through the state.81
Grove characterizes this as a quintessential case of a state protecting the con-
tinued enforceability of state law.  For example, Grove writes that “Missouri
had argued that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act preempted—and thereby ren-
dered unenforceable—its state hunting laws.”82
But Missouri v. Holland was not really a case about preemption or protect-
ing the enforceability of a specific state law.  Tellingly, the State itself does
not mention “preemption” in its brief to the Court83—that just appears to be
Grove’s characterization of the State’s claims.  Furthermore, the Court only
alludes to state law in passing a few times in its opinion, never discussing its
content in any detail (odd for any preemption case).84  It would be more
accurate to say that Missouri v. Holland is a case about power, specifically, the
scope of Congress’s treaty power and the scope of the powers reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment.  The Court even describes Missouri’s cen-
tral claim largely in this way when it writes:
The ground of the bill is that the [federal] statute is an unconstitutional
interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment,
and that the acts of the defendant done and threatened under that authority
invade the sovereign right of the State and contravene its will manifested in
statutes.85
Interestingly, Grove herself has suggested that states do not have stand-
ing to raise such broad claims about institutional power against the federal
government.86  The point here is to highlight the tension in these two posi-
tions and to recognize that these two interests of the state—the interest in
ring on a constitutional challenge to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, but still
interpreting the statute not to apply to state judges).
80 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
81 Id. at 430–31.
82 Grove, supra note 2, at 870.
83 Brief of Appellant, Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (No. 609), reprinted in 20 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 303
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
84 Holland, 252 U.S. at 431 (noting the State’s claim that the treaty “contravene[s] its
will manifested in statutes”); id. at 434 (“The State . . . founds its claim of exclusive author-
ity upon an assertion of title to migratory birds, an assertion that is embodied in statute.”).
85 Id. at 431.
86 Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5 n.18), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3134464 (“[G]overnment institutions should not have special standing to assert
an ‘injury’ to their constitutional powers and duties.  Government entities have no greater
interest in the structural Constitution than any other member of society—and thus suffer
no ‘particularized’ injury when their constitutional powers and duties are threatened.”
(emphasis omitted)).
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preserving a particular law and the interest in preserving the power to enact
such laws—may be inextricably intertwined and thus impossible to disentan-
gle for standing purposes.
Once we recognize that protective standing enables states to attack fed-
eral laws, the danger posed by this form of special solicitude becomes appar-
ent: states could use their interest in “defending state law” as a pretext for
airing their political disagreements with sundry federal policies in federal
court.  The Fourth Circuit noted the danger of broad protective state stand-
ing when it warned that “each state could become a roving constitutional
watchdog of sorts; no issue, no matter how generalized or quintessentially
political, would fall beyond a state’s power to litigate in federal court.”87
B. Limiting Attacks on Federal Law Is Unworkable
Furthermore, given the apparent ease with which states can invoke pro-
tective standing, this danger is potentially unlimited.  For one thing, protec-
tive standing would enable states to challenge more than just federal actions
that threaten to preempt state law, as that term is properly understood.88  For
example, Grove suggests that states may challenge federal laws “that preempt,
or otherwise undermine the enforceability of, state law.”89  In fact, many of the
cases she cites as precedent for protective state standing did not involve pre-
emption.90  In cases like Missouri v. Holland, Colorado v. Toll, and Gonzales v.
Oregon,91 federal laws undermined state law in a different sense: by making
state law superfluous, not unenforceable.  In essence, those federal laws banned
activities the states had authorized—the hunting of migratory birds,92 chauf-
feuring of tourists around a national park,93 and prescribing of lethal over-
doses of controlled substances.94  The states could have continued to
authorize these activities for purposes of state law, notwithstanding the fed-
87 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 271–72 (4th Cir. 2011).
Some readers might welcome expanded federal jurisdiction, or at least, might not view
it as much of a “downside.”  But many proponents of protective state standing appear to
favor imposing some limits on state standing. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 2, at 856 (“[A]
more expansive definition of special state standing might threaten to erode the limits on
the Article III judicial power—by enabling every dispute between a State and the federal
government to wind up in court.”).  The point here is that they may get more than they
bargained for (or want) with protective state standing.
88 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234 (2000) (recognizing that pre-
emption is the equivalent of the repeal of a state statute).
89 Grove, supra note 2, at 857 (emphasis added).
90 Id. at 864–68, 873–76 (discussing cases).
91 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925);
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
92 Holland, 252 U.S. 416.
93 Toll, 268 U.S. 228.
94 Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243.
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eral bans.95  The federal bans would only have deterred private parties from
taking full advantage of the states’ tolerance.
It is also important to recognize that with protective state standing, states
could attack a variety of disagreeable federal actions, and not just acts of
Congress or formal regulations, as proponents seem to suggest.96  After all,
sundry executive actions—including executive orders and even enforcement
decisions—could “undermine” state law, especially in the broad sense propo-
nents use that term (as just described).97
Furthermore, if some disagreeable federal policy did not undermine any
existing state law, the state could always pass a new one that conflicts with the
federal law.  The threat posed to its law would thereafter give the state access
to federal courts to attack the federal statute, regulation, order, enforcement
proceeding, etc., all on the guise of “protecting” state law.
Indeed, Virginia recently used this ploy to wage a challenge to the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in federal court.  It passed the Virginia Health
Care Freedom Act (VHCFA), which declared that “[n]o resident of this Com-
monwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual
insurance coverage.”98  Citing the tension between the VHCFA and the
ACA’s individual mandate, Virginia claimed it had protective standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the ACA in federal court.99
95 Indeed, insofar as these state laws merely authorized activity, Congress could not
have preempted them without violating the anticommandeering rule. See Murphy v.
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018) (holding that a federal law “prohibiting state authori-
zation of sports gambling[ ] violates the anticommandeering rule”); Robert A. Mikos, On
the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal
Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1446 (2009) [hereinafter Mikos, On the Limits] (“[W]hen
state law simply permits private conduct to occur[,] . . . preemption of such a law would be
tantamount to commandeering.”).  And if these federal laws did command the states, the
states could have challenged them without protective standing.  Such commands would
have injured the states’ proprietary interests, e.g., because the states would have had to
spend money to administer them. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16 (2004) (noting that commandeering imposes financial
costs on the states).
96 Cf. Grove, supra, note 2, at 857 (“States have no special interest in the federal execu-
tive’s enforcement of federal law.”).  Not all proponents of protective standing would even
seek to limit its availability in challenges to executive enforcement policies. See Nash, supra
note 2 (suggesting that states have protective standing to challenge enforcement of federal
policy when Congress blocks them from making their own).
97 For discussion of the executive branch’s role in preemption (and federalism more
generally), see, for example, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Essay, Preemption and Commandeering
Without Congress, 70 STAN. L. REV. 2029 (2018); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal
Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2011).
98 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in
original) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (West 2018)).
99 See id.
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To be sure, the ploy did not work for Virginia.  In Virginia ex rel. Cuc-
cinelli v. Sebelius, the Fourth Circuit recognized what the Commonwealth was
trying to do and the danger it posed:
To permit a state to litigate whenever it enacts a statute declaring its opposi-
tion to federal law, . . . would convert the federal judiciary into a ‘forum’ for
the vindication of a state’s ‘generalized grievances about the conduct of gov-
ernment.’ . . . [A] state could acquire standing to challenge any federal law
merely by enacting a statute—even an utterly unenforceable one—purport-
ing to prohibit the application of the federal law.100
Noting that there was no consequence for violating the VHCFA,101 the court
suggested that the threat posed by the ACA to this particular Virginia statute
did not create a cognizable injury for purposes of establishing the Common-
wealth’s standing:
Virginia lacks standing to challenge the individual mandate because the
mandate threatens no interest in the ‘enforceability’ of the VHCFA.
Contrary to Virginia’s arguments, the mere existence of a state law like
the VHCFA does not license a state to mount a judicial challenge to any
federal statute with which the state law assertedly conflicts.  Rather, only
when a federal law interferes with a state’s exercise of its sovereign ‘power to
create and enforce a legal code’ does it inflict on the state the requisite
injury-in-fact.102
Grove has approved of a similar limitation, suggesting that protective
standing “most reasonably applies only to regulatory, not declaratory, state
laws.”103  According to Grove, the latter type of law is one that “merely
declares that private citizens are not subject to legal requirements, and does
not seek to regulate private citizens.”104  She justifies the distinction as
follows:
When a federal statute or administrative action purports to preempt a state
law, that decision has an impact much like a judicial decision striking down
the state law on constitutional grounds; the State is hindered in the enforce-
ment of its law against future private parties. . . .
By contrast, the State does not have the same interest in a law that
merely declares private parties to be exempt from legal requirements.  A
State need not enforce such a law through the federal or state court system;
nor is any private party likely to challenge a ‘declaratory’ law.  In short, a
State need not have standing—against a private party or the federal govern-
100 Id. at 271 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
101 See id. at 267 (“[T]he district court recognized that the VHCFA was only ‘declaratory
[in] nature . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d 656 F.3d 253)).
102 Id. at 269 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted) (first quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 137 (1986); and then quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel.
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)).
103 Grove, supra note 2, at 877.
104 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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ment—to protect the ‘continued enforceability’ of a law that will never be
enforced.105
Confining protective standing to the defense of “regulatory” or “enforce-
able” state laws, however, is unlikely to stop the states from manufacturing
protective standing.  For one thing, the practical challenge of distinguishing
between state laws that should give rise to protective standing and those that
should not may prove insurmountable.  The criteria employed by the Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelli court, emphasizing the need for enforcement,106 is a slippery
one.  In other contexts, courts have struggled to define with clarity what it
means to “enforce” a law.107  And notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit’s sum-
mary conclusion that Virginia had “no interest in the ‘enforceability’ of the
VHCFA,”108 it is possible to conceive of a scenario where the state would have
had such an interest.  For example, suppose that a local government man-
dated the purchase of health insurance; in that scenario, the state might have
invoked the VHCFA to preempt the local mandate, and the local government
might have invoked the ACA to preempt the VHCFA.
The distinction between “declaratory” and “regulatory” laws may prove
no less illusory.  Consider again Missouri v. Holland.  As already noted, Grove
has suggested that the State’s standing in the case was created by the conflict
between Missouri’s laws governing migratory birds and the Federal Migratory
Bird Treaty Act.  Neither Grove nor the Court discusses the content of the
supposedly preempted state law in any detail, but it appears that the state law
at issue may have done no more than assert the state’s title to migratory
birds.109  If so, it is difficult to see why the threat to the state’s law in Missouri
v. Holland created the interest needed for protective standing, but the threat
105 Id. at 878 (footnote omitted).
106 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 269.
107 For example, a provision of the Federal Controlled Substances Act gives state offi-
cials immunity from federal prosecution for any actions taken while “engaged in the
enforcement” of state drug laws.  21 U.S.C. § 885(d) (2012) (emphasis added).  Section
885(d) has generated conflicting opinions about whether state employees are “enforcing”
state law and can thus invoke immunity when they return wrongfully seized marijuana to a
private citizen or operate a marijuana dispensary or safe injection site. See Alex Kreit, Safe
Injection Sites and the Federal “Crack House” Statute, 60 B.C. L. REV. 413 (2019) (discussing
application to safe injection sites); Mikos, On the Limits, supra note 95, at 1457–58 (discuss-
ing confusion over application of § 885(d) to state marijuana reforms).
108 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 269 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137
(1986)).
109 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (“The State . . . founds its claim of
exclusive authority upon an assertion of title to migratory birds, an assertion that is embod-
ied in statute.”).  A section of Missouri law in effect circa 1919 provides, in relevant part,
that “[t]he ownership of and title to all birds, fish and game, whether resident, migratory
or imported, in the state of Missouri, not now held by private ownership, legally acquired,
is hereby declared to be in the state . . . .” MO. REV. STAT. § 5581 (1919).  Other provisions
of state law did arguably regulate such birds, e.g., by prohibiting the killing of them with-
out the state’s permission, see id. §§ 5582, 5590, but the Court did not refer to those more
regulatory provisions in its opinion, and so it is unclear whether any of them actually
played a role in its standing analysis.
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to the state’s law in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli did not.  After all, both seem to
do no more than declare that the federal government may not regulate a par-
ticular subject—wild birds or insurance free riders.
Another reason this limitation fails to cabin protective standing is that
most (if not all) “declaratory” state laws (or laws not requiring enforcement)
could be redrafted as “regulatory” laws that require administration.  To illus-
trate, suppose Virginia had passed a law providing a state subsidy to any state
resident ordered by the Federal Internal Revenue Service to pay a tax penalty
for refusing to buy minimum health insurance.  (Or to make the example
more generalizable, imagine a state law that indemnifies residents for the
costs of any fines the federal government imposes for violations of federal
laws the state finds disagreeable.)  This version of Virginia’s law would
require some “enforcement”—for example, state officials would need to
decide whether a given resident claiming the subsidy actually met the law’s
requirements.  Under Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli and Grove’s regulatory/declar-
atory formula, then, passage of such a law would give the state the cognizable
interest it needs to establish protective standing and proceed with its claim
that the ACA individual mandate was unconstitutional.  Of course, the fed-
eral court might find that the Virginia statute as rewritten is preempted.110  It
seems reasonable to suppose that Congress would not want a state subsidizing
actions the federal government is seeking to curb (like foregoing health
insurance).  But that realization does not deprive the state of standing to
make the claim anyway, and if Virginia convinces a court that the federal law
is unconstitutional, the preemption concern dissolves.
Nor would other requirements, like causation, necessarily stop states
from manufacturing protective standing to attack federal law.  Under the
causation requirement, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must allege
that the other party in the dispute was the primary cause of its (cognizable)
injury—i.e., that the party invoking federal jurisdiction did not inflict that
injury on itself.
When the state alleges an injury to its proprietary interests, the causation
requirement arguably does prevent the state from manufacturing standing.
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey nicely illustrates this principle.111  Pennsylvania
sued New Jersey in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, claiming that
New Jersey’s discriminatory taxes on nonresidents (viz., Pennsylvanians) who
earned income in New Jersey violated the Constitution.112  For purposes of
standing, Pennsylvania claimed that New Jersey’s law had deprived the Com-
monwealth of tax revenue, an injury to its proprietary interests, because
Pennsylvania law allowed Pennsylvanians to deduct the taxes they paid to
110 See Mikos, supra note 53, at 71 (“[A] state could not indemnify the fines imposed by
the federal government on convicted [federal] offenders.  Indemnification of such fines
would almost certainly be preempted because it would encourage the commission of fed-
eral offenses . . . .”).
111 Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam).
112 See id. at 661–63.
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New Jersey when calculating their tax liability to Pennsylvania.113  The Court,
however, found that Pennsylvania had caused its own financial injury and
thus lacked standing: “No State can be heard to complain about damage
inflicted by its own hand.”114  After all, as the Court noted, Pennsylvania was
not required to let its own residents deduct the taxes they paid to New Jersey.
However, applying this particular limitation proves far more challenging
when the state alleges an injury to its sovereign interests.  Protective standing
suggests that a state has a cognizable interest in preserving its laws, not just
preserving its finances.  Hence, telling a state to change its laws (the solution
in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey) does not relieve all of the state’s injuries: it just
substitutes one injury (changing a law) for another one (suffering a financial
loss).
Texas v. United States illustrates the weakness of the causation require-
ment for protective standing.115  In the case, as discussed above, Texas chal-
lenged DAPA, claiming that under the policy, it would be forced to issue
driver’s licenses to some undocumented immigrants, at a financial loss to the
state.  The federal government claimed (correctly) that Texas had inflicted
this financial injury on itself, by subsidizing the costs of driver’s licenses.116
Citing Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, the federal government suggested that Texas
could avoid this financial injury by raising its fees to cover the full costs of
issuing licenses.117  The court, however, rejected this suggestion:
The flaw in the [federal] government’s reasoning is that Texas’s forced
choice between incurring costs and changing its fee structure is itself an
injury: A plaintiff suffers an injury even if it can avoid that injury by incurring
other costs.  And being pressured to change state law constitutes an injury.118
Perhaps to assuage concerns raised by its dilution of the causation
requirement, the Fifth Circuit hinted that it would scrutinize the State’s
motives to prevent it from manufacturing its own standing.  In the case, it just
found that Texas’s motives were pure: “Texas’s forced choice between incur-
ring costs and changing its laws is an injury because those laws exist for the
administration of a state program, not to challenge federal law, and Texas did
not enact them merely to create standing.”119
But the court failed to explain how it reached this conclusion with
respect to Texas’s law, let alone, how it would discern pretext in future cases.
113 See id. at 663.
114 Id. at 664.
115 Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
116 Id. at 749; see also Brief for Professor Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 8, United States v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL
909413, at *8 (arguing that “voluntary choices by Texas, rather than any federal action, are
the legally cognizable cause of any increased state expenditures on driver’s licenses” follow-
ing DAPA).
117 Texas, 787 F.3d at 749.
118 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
119 Id. (emphasis added).
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Commentators have fared no better in their attempts to elucidate this test.
For example, Professor Bradford Mank has suggested that states should have
standing to defend only those laws passed before adoption of the challenged
federal policy.120  However, this limitation is both underinclusive and overin-
clusive.  It is underinclusive because it would allow states to defend laws
passed in anticipation of federal policy, even laws adopted solely to give the
states standing to challenge that policy.  It is overinclusive because it would
stop states from defending laws passed after adoption of the federal policy,
even if those laws were adopted without any regard for standing.  Ultimately,
I see no way out of the predicament.  If a state has a cognizable interest in
protecting its law, the doctrine of causation either has too few teeth, as in
Texas v. United States, or too many, if a court adheres to Pennsylvania v. New
Jersey.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has made the case against protective state standing.  Contrary
to the claims of its proponents, states do not actually need protective stand-
ing to enforce or defend their own laws.  It is, in other words, standing for
nothing.  Indeed, states are more likely to use this form of special solicitude
for an altogether different and less benign (to most) purpose: to attack fed-
eral law.  In particular, protective state standing could enable states to chal-
lenge in federal court virtually any federal policy they find disagreeable,
making them “roving constitutional watchdog[s]”121 over the federal govern-
ment.  And apart from rejecting this form of special solicitude altogether,
there may be little the federal courts can do to stop them.
120 See Mank, supra note 2, at 224 (“Texas had not manufactured standing because the
Texas legislature had adopted subsidized licenses a year before the government
announced the DACA program and three years before DHS promulgated DAPA.”).
121 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL507.txt unknown Seq: 24  1-JUL-19 11:58
2056 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
